



NFCuLT

An easy and nice tool that will make you have fun, or... make profit!

Who I am

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 - Security Engineer and researcher at Secure Network S.r.l.
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- **Speaker at:**
 - **DefCon 21** - «OPT it won't save you from free rides»
 - **30C3** - «How to build a safe NFC ticketing system»
 - **BlackHat US 14's Arsenal**
 - **DefCon 22 SkyTalks**
 - **BlackHat EU 14's Arsenal**
 - And now here at **TetCon 2015**



Who I am

- **Technical Research Leader at OPFOR**, a Physical Security Dep. of Secure Network with focus on:
 - Electronic Access Gate
 - Ticketing System Security
 - Physical Penetration Test
 - Device Vulnerability Research
- **Member of PhySec OPFOR's RedTeam**



What we are dealing with

- **MIFARE ULTRALIGHT** tags as tickets
 - Designed to work @13.56 MHz
 - Manufactured by NXP semiconductors
 - Worldwide largest installed platform
 - More than 50 million MIFARE reader core components
 - More than 5 billion ICs



Use of NFC on transportation systems



- Ticketing systems that work at very high speeds to reduce queues at tube and train stations
- Usually, absolutely not safe

– Why?

Memory Layout

- **512 bits of memory (64 bytes)** arranged in 16 *pages* of 4 bytes
- **Different memory areas:**
 - UID and Internal Byte
 - The Lock Bytes
 - OTP Area
 - Data Area

Page Address		Byte #			
DEC	HEX	0	1	2	3
0	0x00	UID			
1	0x01	UID			
2	0x02	UID	Internal	Lock Byte	Lock Byte
3	0x03	OTP			
From 4 to 15	0x04 to 0x0F	Data			

UID and Internal Bytes

- 7 bytes for *Serial Number*
 - SN0 to SN6
- 1 byte for *Internal*
- 2 *Check bytes* as a result of XOR operations
 - CB0 and CB1
- All of them are programmed by the manufacturer: **read only**

Page Address		Byte #			
DEC	HEX	0	1	2	3
0	0x00	SN0	SN1	SN2	CB0
1	0x01	SN3	SN4	SN5	SN6
2	0x02	CB1	Internal	Lock Byte	Lock Byte
3	0x03	OTP			
From 4 to 15	0x04 to 0x0F	Data			


UID and Internal Bytes

- How CB0 and CB1 are evaluated?
 - **CB0** = $0x88 \oplus SN0 \oplus SN1 \oplus SN2$
 - **CB1** = $SN3 \oplus SN4 \oplus SN5 \oplus SN6$

Page Address		Byte #			
DEC	HEX	0	1	2	3
0	0x00	SN0	SN1	SN2	CB0
1	0x01	SN3	SN4	SN5	SN6
2	0x02	CB1	Internal	Lock Byte	Lock Byte
3	0x03	OTP			
From 4 to 15	0x04 to 0x0F	Data			

Lock Bytes

- 2 bytes



- Possibility of making a whole page (4 bytes) read-only
- Possibility of making the Lock Bytes themselves read-only

Lock Bytes

- They cannot be edited as you want
 - What you are about to write is simply bitwise *ORed* with the present data

OR	0	1
0	0	1
1	1	1

- One bit in state **1** cannot be turned into **0** anymore

Page Address		Byte #			
DEC	HEX	0	1	2	3
0	0x00	UID			
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From 4 to 15	0x04 to 0x0F	Data			

OTP Bytes

- The **only** security function in MIFARE ULTRALIGHT tags
- 4 bytes, 0x00 by default
- As the Lock Bytes, what you are about to write is *ORed* with the present data
- *One-Time Programmable*
 - *Not One-Time Password !*

Page Address		Byte #			
DEC	HEX	0	1	2	3
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From 4 to 15	0x04 to 0x0F	Data			

Data Sector

- Largest sector
 - 48 bytes, arranged in 12 pages
- Read / Write mode
- For transportation system applications this sector will store
 - Time of last stamp
 - Validator Machine ID
 - Bus line or underground stop

Page Address		Byte #			
<i>DEC</i>	<i>HEX</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>0</i>	<i>0x00</i>	<i>UID</i>			
<i>1</i>	<i>0x01</i>	<i>UID</i>			
<i>2</i>	<i>0x02</i>	<i>UID</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Lock Byte</i>	<i>Lock Byte</i>
<i>3</i>	<i>0x03</i>	<i>OTP</i>			
<i>From 4 to 15</i>	<i>0x04 to 0x0F</i>	<i>Data</i>			

Pros & Cons

- **Pros**

- Cheap
- Possibility of creating limited tickets
 - Expiration after a finite number of times
 - Good for public transportation systems



- **Cons**

- No hardware encryption
- Usually not well implemented on public transportation systems:
 - Reset Attack [2012]
 - Lock Attack [2013]
 - Time Attack [2013]
 - Replay Attack [2014]

How easily is to exploit the related vulnerabilities?

Here comes NFCuIT !

Attack 1 - Lock Attack




- **Lock Attack**
 - Mostly overcome
- **Extremely easy task to perform**
 - Step 1: set the correct lock bit
 - Step 2: have fun!

Page Address		Byte #			
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Attack 1 - Lock Attack

- Acting on the lock bits
- We can make a sector of the ticket read-only
 - Just turn a bit from 0 into 1 (L-OTP)
- Lock attack with our app
 - **just press a button!**
- The stamping machine tries to validate the ticket
 - No feedback for the (failed) write operation
- The number of rides is freezed!



Attack 1 - Lock Attack

- Check if last time stamp is older than n minutes:
 - No → the ticket is still valid
 - Yes → let's stamp the ticket
 - Check if there are rides left:
 - No → the ticket is useless
 - Yes → let's stamp it
 - » Write Timestamp → OK
 - » Write other stuff → OK
 - » Write the new number of rides left → KO
- No feedback → WIN
- Do not forget to take one ride off !
- Easily fixable
 - Just check the state of L-OTP bit and decide whether to validate the ticket or not


Type of multiple ride ticket: 5 rides ticket




Ticket is valid. 5 Rides left

Attack 2 - Time Attack

- **Time Attack**
 - Attacker is required to understand the *format* of the timestamp
 - The *location* where the timestamp is stored must be identified as well
 - The timestamp *is not encrypted*
- **Four (4) simple steps to own the ticket system**
 - Set the right page
 - Set the starting timestamp's date
 - Set your desired timestamp's time
 - Have fun with your brand new ticket!




Attack 2 - Time Attack



1. Set the date of the timestamp

1. Choose the right data page



3. Setting the desired time of timestamp

4. Write data to the ticket

Attack 3 - Reply Attack

- **Replay Attack**
 - Assumptions
 - No online database of tickets are available
 - Attacker needs a valid source ticket
 - The attacker owns a *clone* MIFARE Ultralight tag
- **Three (3) simple steps**
 - Dump the ticket
 - Edit key information
 - Write to the blank UL tag

Attack 3 - Reply Attack

- We love Chinese stuff!
 - Perfect clone of UL ticket
 - No read-only pages
- **Just clone your real ticket!**
 - Add a ride to the cloned ticket
 - Stamp your brand new cloned ticket
 - Clone it back on the real ticket
 - Or directly use the clone
 - Pay attention to the number of rides
- Have fun!




Attack 3 - Reply Attack

- **Considerations**
 - Encrypted ticket
 - Encryption can be circumnavigated by cloning the whole encrypted data
 - It works if the whole data area is encrypted
 - It works if the timestamp is encrypted
 - It works because
 - The stamping machine is validating a cloned ticket, but with a ride more
 - The clone tag has the same number or rides left, but an updated timestamp

What if you could simply
edit your tag as you prefer?


Custom Edit

- Just write whatever you want wherever you prefer:
 - Fix UID bytes (if you broke them)
 - Write arbitrary data to pages
- **Be careful!**
 - If you are not using a clone UL, you could lock forever some pages



Dump Edit

- Now you can edit your saved dump:
 - For **privacy** and **security** reasons dumps are stored in private directory of the app located in `/data/data/org.bughardy.nfcult/files/`
 - **Without root** permission an external app can not access to those files
 - Now you can edit them within the NFCuIT app
- **Why it is useful?**
 - This is a must-have features for reply attack, since very often you need to add a ride to your dump
 - You can **reply** the edited dump **directly** to your ticket or save it as a new one






Base Conversion

- Now from the *Dump Edit* tab you can convert values in different bases for a more in-deep understanding of data on the ticket.

- **It supports:**

- Hex → Bin
- Hex → Dec
- Bin → Hex
- Bin → Dec
- Dec → Hex
- Dec → Bin



ART Ready

- Now NFCulT supports also **ART**
- That means it **is ready to use** also on **Android 5.0** smartphones
- In the next release I'll probably work on a tablet version



Where to find

- Source code and dev build are on github:

- <https://github.com/securenetwork/nfcult>



- APK and official signed builds are available on Play Store:

- <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.bughardy.nfcult>

